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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RICKY LEE SANDERS, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
v. : CaseNo.20000203-SC 
MICHAEL 0. LEAVITT, et al., : 
Defendants - Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF STATE DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES 
Defendants Michael O. Leavitt, Kerry Steadman, Mary T. Noonan, Jan Graham, 
Carol Clawson, Linda Luinstra, Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell, Larry Lunt, the 
Monitoring Panel, the Utah Department of Human Services and the Division of Family 
Services submit this answering brief as appellees. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The Division of Family Services (DFS) has retained its immunity relevant to 
the plaintiffs wrongful death claims that arise out of an assault and battery. 
This issue was raised in the trial court by this defendant's motion to dismiss and its 
motion for summary judgment. R. 25-29,187-89, 257-388, 625-29. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was decided below upon DFS's motion 
for summary judgment. Reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion for summary 
judgment "includes a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied governing 
law, affording no deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of law." 
Burton v. Exam Or. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. Inc.. 2000 UT 18, f t , 994 P.2d 1261; 
Gardner v. Perry City. 2000 UT App 1, ^ 6, 994 P.2d 811. "In matters of pure statutory 
interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no 
deference to its legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 
519 (Utah 1997). 
2. The trial court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to enforce a 
federal court consent decree and that plaintiff had no valid claim for damages based upon 
the federal consent decree. 
This issue was raised by the defendants in their motion to dismiss. R. 32-36, 189-
91. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the defendants' 
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give 
the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zion's 
First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
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3. The trial court was without jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claims against the 
Monitoring Panel and defendants Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell and Larry Lunt 
because no notice of claim was filed concerning these defendants. 
This issue was raised in the defendants1 motion to dismiss. R. 37-38. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because this issue raises only questions of law, the 
Court should give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness 
standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co., 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
4. That the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the Monitoring Panel and 
defendants Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell and Larry Lunt, who are also entitled to 
quasi-judicial immunity. 
These issues were raised by the defendants1 motion to dismiss. R. 38-43, 192-95. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the defendants1 
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give 
the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zionfs 
First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. (1992) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from:... 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with 
contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time for 
filing notice. (1987) 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed by Ricky Lee Sanders on his own behalf and as the personal 
representative of the estate of Breanna Marie Loveless. R. 2. Breanna died on February 
22, 1996. R. 6. Plaintiff pled a claim for wrongful death against the state defendants 
(Claims I and IV in the complaint) and for breach of contract and breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Claims II and III in Ihe complaint). R. 9-14. 
Plaintiff also sued various attorneys who represented the plaintiffs in a federal court class 
action proceeding and Bobbie Dawn Widdison (Breanna's mother) and Travis Widdison. 
R. 14-17. 
Default judgments were taken against Ms. Widdison and Travis Widdison. 234-
35. The State of Utah defendants (Leavitt, Steadman, Noonan, Graham, Clawson, 
Luinstra, Atkinson, Cotterell, Lunt, the Monitoring Panel, the Utah Department of Human 
Services and the Division of Family Services (DFS)) filed a motion to dismiss. R. 20-
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104, 136-38. The trial court granted this motion as to all of the state defendants except as 
to DFS. The wrongful death claim (Claim I) as to DFS was not dismissed. R. 238-42. 
The attorney defendants1 motion to dismiss was also granted. R. 236-37. 
DFS then filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining wrongful death 
claim. R. 245-388. The trial court granted this motion on February 14,2000. R. 733-37. 
While no final judgment has been entered against Bobbie Dawn Widdison and Travis 
Widdison, the trial court certified its decision of February 14, 2000 as a final order. R. 
736-37. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on March 9, 2000. R. 742-44. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiffs minor daughter, Breanna, died on February 22, 1996 as the result of 
pneumonia, which resulted from and was aggravated by the abuse and neglect to which 
she was subjected by her mother, Bobbie Dawn Widdison, and her mother's boyfriend, 
Travis Widdison. R. 6, 8. In his complaint, the plaintiff expressly alleged: 
27. On February 21, 1996, Breanna was taken to the Delta Community 
Medical Center Emergency Room in Deha, where she died in the early 
morning hours of February 22, 1996. The immediate cause of Breanna's 
death was pneumonia, which resulted from and was aggravated by the 
abuse and neglect to which she had been subjected. The medical examiner 
determined specifically that the pneumonia was aggravated by physical 
abuse and Breanna's generally weakened condition. 
48. The State defendants breached their agreement with Breanna, and their 
breach of the agreement foreseeably led to Breanna's abuse, suffering, and 
death at the hands of Bobbie Dawn and Travis. 
79. Bobbie Dawn and Travis, together, in willful and deliberate disregard 
of the health, care, safety and well-being of Breanna, neglected her health, 
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care, safety and well-being, and also physically abused her, to the point at 
which, in a weakened condition, she developed pneumonia which caused 
her death. 
R. 8, 12, 17. 
Breanna was a member of the plaintiff class in a federal action entitled David C. v. 
Leavitt 93-C-206W (D.Utah 1994). R. 4-5. The parties to that action entered into a 
settlement agreement that a consent decree could be issued on May 17, 1994. R. 49-104. 
Defendants Leavitt, Steadman, Noonan, Clawson, and Luinstra signed the settlement 
agreement. R. 100. The settlement agreement did not provide for any monetary damages 
for a breach of the agreement, but instead provided: 
The Court [U.S. District Court for the District of Utah] shall retain 
jurisdiction over these claims solely for the purpose of enforcement of the 
Agreement. If non-compliance is not resolved through the corrective action 
process, as described above, the Court may enter any necessary orders to 
enforce the Agreement. 
R.98. 
The settlement agreement provided for the appointment of three persons to serve 
as a Monitoring Panel to determine compliance with the consent decree. R. 95. The 
panel was to provide quarterly reports as to how well the State of Utah was complying 
with the conditions of the settlement agreement. R. 96-97. Tf the panel determined that 
there had been non-compliance with the agreement, it had the authority to adopt 
corrective action plans (either as submitted by DFS or as created by the panel) to remedy 
such non-compliance. R. 97. The determinations of the panel could be reviewed by the 
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United States District Court for the District of Utah. R. 97-98. The settlement agreement 
established that the sole remedy for solving problems concerning individual cases was for 
the plaintiff class' attorneys to bring the matter before the grievance council established 
by Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-102(3) (1994), and quarterly to bring such disputes to the 
monitoring panel. R. 98-104. 
On May 15, 1998, Bobbie Dawn Widdison was convicted of "knowingly and 
intentionally inflicting upon B.M.C.L. [Breanna] a serious physical injury, or, having the 
care and custody of B.M.C.L., intentionally or knowingly causing or permitting another to 
cause serious physical injury to B.M.C.L.; caused the death of B.M.C.L., an infant who at 
the time was eight months of age." R. 270-79. She was convicted of murder, three 
counts of felony child abuse and three counts of misdemeanor child abuse. Id Travis D. 
Widdison was convicted at the same time of inflicting serious physical injury on Breanna. 
R. 280-88. He was convicted of felony child abuse and two counts of misdemeanor child 
abuse. IcL 
At the criminal trial, Dr. Robert H. Kirshner, a forensic pathologist, testified. R. 
289-378. In preparation for the Widdisonfs criminal trial, Dr. Kirshner reviewed 
Breanna's autopsy records, medical records, and various documents relating to the 
investigation of her death. R. 309-10. The undisputed testimony was that Breanna was 
subjected to repeated abuse (assaults) before her death. R. 309-21. Dr. Kirshner testified 
that, in his expert opinion, Breanna died of the multiple episodes of abuse that she had 
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been subjected to. That, but for the abuse, she would not have died of pneumonia, which 
is often the terminal event for a child who has been chronically abused. This is so 
because the abuse has led to the suppression of the body's immune systems. R. 323-26. 
A. Well again, this pneumonia is the direct result of the fact that this is a 
battered child. And pneumonia is a terminal event in a child that has been 
repetitively battered over a number of weeks, and therefore, it's not 
coincidental that this child has pneumonia. It's not just an unfortunate 
occurrence. It's a predictable outcome of what has happened to this child 
and I've seen it again and again in battered children who finally succumb to 
pneumonia due to the effects of the abuse, the suppression of the immune 
system, which is the development of the infection. So to me, it is clearly a 
homicide. 
R. 325-26. 
Dr. Leis (the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Breanna) testified 
that: 
A. Traumatic injury to the body will not only physically damage the body, 
but circumstances surrounding it can impart some degree of emotional 
trauma on the individual with recurrent trauma or majfbe one episode of a 
significant degree. They may stress the body to such a point that a natural 
disease process which may normally in and of itself not progress to a fatal 
condition now attack the weakened body, if you will, and become more 
significant and lead to the death of the individual. 
R. 448. 
Q. In your opinion, doctor, would Breanna Loveless have died of 
pnuemonia in the absence of effect of physical trauma that she also 
suffered? 
A. I don't believe so. 
R. 450. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While she died of pneumonia, Breanna's death arose out of the assault and battery 
committed upon her by her mother and her mother's boyfriend. The trial court correctly 
determined that there was some causal relationship between the physical abuse and the 
onset of the pneumonia. Under Utah law the immunity of DFS has not been waived for 
such claims. Plaintiff has failed to meet the high hurdle for seeking a reversal of this 
Court's previous decisions on this issue. 
Plaintiffs contract claims arise out of alleged violations by the defendants of a 
settlement agreement reached in a federal matter. The trial court was without jurisdiction 
to seek to enforce such an agreement. Any enforcement should be left to the federal court 
which has retained ongoing jurisdiction over the proceeding. Further, the plaintiff has 
failed to articulate what rights under the agreement were violated. Indeed, the settlement 
agreement did not create any right for monetary damages. 
The monitoring panel created by the settlement agreement is not a legal entity that 
can sue or be sued. The trial court was without jurisdiction of any claims for negligence 
against the members of the monitoring panel because no notice of claim was filed 
concerning them. Its members are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and the plaintiff 
failed to state a claim against them. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
L DFS IS IMMUNE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S 
ALLEGED INJURIES AROSE OUT OF AN ASSAULT 
OR BATTERY 
On appeal, plaintiff challenges the dismissal of his wrongful death claim only as to 
the Division of Family Services (DFS). R. 743. Neither his notice of appeal nor his 
opening brief has challenged the dismissal of his wrongful death claim as to the other 
state defendants based upon his failure to file the proper notices of claim concerning 
them. 
This Court has applied a three step approach to determining whether or not 
immunity is applicable to a specific case. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 
1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The first step is to determine whether the activity performed by 
the entity is a governmental function. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act grants 
immunity to governmental entities in their exercise of governmental functions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1991). In the instant action, plaintiff has stated that he does not 
dispute that this step is met. Appellants Brief at 33. 
The second step requires a determination of whether there is a waiver of immunity. 
If such a waiver exists, the third step involves a determination regarding any exceptions to 
the waiver. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et seq., does not 
contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts such as assault and battery. Atiya v. 
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Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007,1011 (Utah App. 1993). Bobbie Dawn Widdison and 
Travis Widdison were named as parties to this action and they have been found liable for 
damages based upon their wilful abuse of Breanna that led to her death. R. 17,234,235. 
The plaintiff claims that the waiver of immunity found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10 (1992) is applicable. This statute waives immunity for injuries proximately caused 
by the negligence of government employees, unless the injury "arises out of1 one of a list 
of retentions of immunity. One such retention in subsection 2 for injury arising out of 
assaults and batteries. Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse its decision in Taylor v. Ogden 
City Sch. Dist. 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996). First, he asks this Court to reverse its decision 
that section 63-30-10(2) is applicable to assaults and batteries performed by non-
governmental employees. Second, he seeks a reversal of this Court's definition of what is 
meant by the statutory term "arising out of." 
A. Plaintiff has not met his substantial burden of persuasion to overcome the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis 
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last resort is that a 
court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the rule 
of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced 
that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent. 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994); State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 341 8, 
999P.2dl. 
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Plaintiff has failed to articulate, let alone clearly convince, how this Court's 
previous decisions are wrong. At most, he claims that the statute in question could be 
interpreted in different ways and therefore this Court should do away with a line of 
established precedents beginning with Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist. 849 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1993). This Court, since Ledfors. has repeatedly rejected the claim that the 
retention of immunity arising out of assaults and batteries should only be applied to cases 
where the assailant was a government employee. Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163-64. For 
example, in Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993), this Court 
explained that: 
Nothing suggests that the one committing the assault or battery need be a 
governmental employee, and the entire focus of the subsection is upon the 
negligent government employee, not on the intentionally acting assailant. 
Because it is the negligence of the governmental employee upon which any 
claim of liability must rest, it would make no sense to engraft upon that 
waiver a limitation based upon the status of the assailant. 
Nor does the plaintiff articulate why this Court's decisions in Taylor and prior 
cases as to how to interpret the phrase "arising but of1 are clearly wrong. 
Plaintiff has failed to meet his substantial burden and the trial court's reliance upon 
this Court's prior decisions should be affirmed. 
B. Breannafs death arose out of an assault and battery. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the assault and battery retention of immunity 
apply regardless of the particular type of negligence that the plaintiff may claim, or how 
the plaintiff may style her claims. The important question is not the type of negligence 
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alleged, but rather whether the injuries arose out of an assault. In Ledfors. this Court 
explained: 
Again, our prior cases have looked to whether the injury 
asserted "arose out of1 conduct or a situation specifically 
described in one of the subparts of 63-30-10; if it did, then 
immunity is preserved. We have rejected claims that have 
reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury.. . . 
In sum, the Ledforses ignore the fact that the structure of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, especially section 63-30-
10, focuses on the conduct or situation out of which the injury 
arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or 
the type of negligence alleged. Because Richie's injuries 
arose out of a battery, we cannot ignore the plain meaning and 
fair import of section 63-30-10 of the Act. 
Id. at 1166-67 (citing Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 314, 316, 445 P.2d 367, 368 
(1968)). See also Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1987) 
(rejecting argument that assault and battery exception did not apply to claim that two 
police officers negligently failed to intervene to prevent beating of plaintiff by another 
officer). 
This Court reached the same conclusion in Malcolm v. State. 878 P.2d 1144, 1146-
47 (Utah 1994); S.H. v. State. 865 P.2d 1363, 1364-65 (Utah 1993); Petersen v. Bd. of 
Educ. 855 P.2d 241, 242-43 (Utah 1993); and Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 
231, 240-41 (Utah 1993). In each of these decisions, this Court reiterated that the 
question of whether the retention of immunities under section 10 are applicable is 
determined not by considering the type of negligence alleged, but rather looking to 
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whether or not the complained of injuries arose out of one of the listed situations or 
conducts found in section 10. 
Finally, in Taylor, this Court expressly defined what was meant by the statutory 
phrase "arose out of." 
Taylor maintains that the assault exception should not apply because 
Zachary's injuries have a greater link to the dangerous window in the 
restroom than to Trenton's assault. However, "arises out of1 within the 
assault exception f"is a phrase of much broader significance than "cause 
by."1" Under the phrase's ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole 
cause of the injury to except the governmental entity from liability for the 
injury. The language demands "'only that there be some causal relationship 
between the injury and the risk'" provided for. 
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 (emphasis in original). 
It is undisputed that Breanna was the victim of physical abuse. Her mother was 
convicted of murder based on the theory that the physical abuse was causally related to 
Breanna's death from pneumonia, just as the assailant in Taylor had been convicted of the 
assault. The undisputed evidence is that pneumonia is often the terminal event for a child 
who has been repeatedly battered as was Breanha. R. 325-26. Plaintiff himself alleged in 
his complaint that "[t]he immediate cause of Breanna's death was pneumonia, which 
resulted from and was aggravated by the abuse and neglect to which she had been 
subjected." R. 8. The trial court correctly found that the evidence could only support a 
finding that some causal relationship existed between the physical abuse (battery) 
inflicted upon Breanna and her final death due to a complication - pneumonia. 
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For the most part, plaintiff seeks to twist the criminal trial evidence so as to be 
contrary to the express opinions given by the witnesses. Such efforts failed to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. The only evidence claimed by the plaintiff 
contrary to his own allegation of his complaint (that Breanna's death by pneumonia 
resulted from the aggravated abuse she received at the hand of her mother and her 
boyfriend) is the affidavit of Dr. Nygaard. R. 708-13. But Dr. Nygaard does not dispute 
the existence of the physical abuse. He does not dispute the crucial fact about the 
physical abuse; that there can be some causal relationship between physical abuse and an 
infant becoming more susceptible to death by pneumonia thereby. Instead, he simply 
claims the truism that pneumonia is directly caused by a virus or a bacteria. His affidavit 
fails to address at all the crucial issue of whether some causal relationship existed 
between the pneumonia and the physical abuse (assault and battery), instead only 
speaking of direct causation. The trial court correctly found that the undisputed facts 
showed some causal relationship between Breanna's death and the assaults and batteries 
that she endured. 
But if plaintiff could prove that Breanna's death by pneumonia was unrelated to the 
physical abuse (assault and battery) that she suffered, plaintiff would only succeed in 
demonstrating that he had no cause of action against DFS. If a normally healthy child 
could have quickly died of pneumonia in the same circumstances, without any prior 
history of abuse, then plaintiff would have failed to prove any duty on the part of DFS. 
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No duty, other than to investigate allegations of abuse under the settlement agreement, 
has been alleged by the plaintiff. If the plaintiffs claims are not based on the abuse, then 
the plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 
For these reasons, the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s First Cause of Action 
should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 
AWARD DAMAGES FOR ALLEGED BREACHES OF A FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Plaintiffs second and third causes of action against these defendants both rest upon 
the claim that Breanna had a contract with the state defendants, created by the settlement 
agreement (consent decree) in the federal David C. case. Plaintiff claims that the state 
defendants breached the settlement agreement and that he is entitled to monetary damages 
for these alleged violations of their duties under the settlement agreement. The settlement 
agreement is not a simple final judgment. It does not set out an award of damages or a set 
of rights between the parties. Instead, the settlement agreement seeks to create a major 
change in the manner in which agencies of the State of Utah function. It sets goals as to 
how DFS is to function and established processes by which alleged non-conformance on 
a systemic and individual basis could be corrected. R. 49-104. No provision is made in 
the settlement agreement for monetary damages in case of non-compliance, instead the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah is expressly given continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. R. 98. 
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A. No independent cause of action exists to enforce a federal consent decree. 
The trial court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to inject itself 
into the federal court's ongoing supervision of the David C. consent decree. Instead, any 
claim that the settlement agreement was being violated should be addressed to the 
supervising federal court by means of a contempt proceeding. In the trial court, the 
plaintiff correctly cited (R. 177-78) a venerable United States Supreme Court decision for 
the long established proposition that: 
It is true, the sovereignties are distinct, and neither can interfere with the 
proper jurisdiction of the other, as was so clearly shown by Chief Justice 
Taney, in the case of Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; and hence the State 
courts have no power to revise the action of the Federal courts, nor the 
Federal the State, except where the Federal Constitution or laws are 
involved. 
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876). 
More recently, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (whose decisions 
are binding on the federal district court of Utah) has expressly held that state courts do not 
have any jurisdiction over a federally supervised consent decree. Klein v. Zavaras. 80 
F.3d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1996) ("That decree was entered by the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado, and the Lincoln County Court did not have jurisdiction 
to enforce its terms."). Under federal law, consent decrees cannot be enforced by means 
of an independent action, but only through invocation of the continuing jurisdiction of the 
appropriate court. Figures v. Bd. of Pub. Util. of City of Kansas City, Kansas. 967 F.2d 
357, 361 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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The district court held that Figures could not now maintain an independent 
action to enforce the Consent Decree, because one could only bring this 
claim in the original case invoking the court's continuing jurisdiction over 
that matter. This ruling was not in error. . . . To permit an individual suit 
to enforce the Consent Decree would interfere with the court's continuing 
jurisdiction over that matter. 
Federal law does not recognize independent damage claims based upon the terms 
of a settlement agreement or consent decree. Klein, 80 F.3d at 435; DeGidio v. Pung, 920 
F.2d 525, 534 (8th Cir. 1990); Green v. McKaskle. 788 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1986). 
In DeGidio the court best explained the purpose behind these rulings. 
In Green, the court noted that contempt actions provide an adequate remedy 
for violations of court orders. A consent decree is negotiated by the parties 
and may be extremely detailed and provide relief far beyond constitutional 
requirements. Thus, such decrees provide exceptional relief for prisoners. 
Allowing a damage claim under section 1983, as well as a contempt action 
for enforcement, "would discourage prison officials from agreeing to such 
benefits." Further, prison officials with limited resources may not be able to 
implement every aspect of a wide-ranging remedial decree. They may be 
forced to choose, possibly after consultation with class representatives, 
which provisions to implement. Compliance would be deterred if 
individual prisoners were allowed to seek damages for violations of every 
detail of the decree. 
920 F.2d at 534 (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff was free to bring a separate action for any violation of his rights, or for 
any state claim that he believed he possessed. But the trial court correctly held that 
plaintiff was not free to seek enforcement of the settlement agreement and consent decree 
through a separate action. This decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
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B- The settlement agreement did not create a cause of action for damages. 
11
 [A] consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes 
basically as a contract," the terms of the decree and the respective 
obligations of the parties must be found within the four comers of the 
consent decree, "[T]he decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather 
the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant 
decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective 
parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve .... [T]he instrument 
must be construed as it is written" . . . 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Scherer. 7 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1993). 
In the David C. agreement, the State of Utah agreed to many things. It agreed to 
meet standards on how it would respond to allegations of child abuse and many other 
issues. It agreed to permit its conduct to be reviewed by the monitoring panel and the 
class representatives1 attorneys. Mechanisms were created for enforcing the settlement 
agreement. But at no time did the agreement create a right to monetary damages. No 
such condition was agreed to or even mentioned. The plaintiffs contractual claims fail 
because no such contractual claim for damages exists under the settlement agreement. 
This Court has stated that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does 
not "make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Nor will we 
construe the covenant 'to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by 
the parties/" Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). But this is exactly what 
the plaintiff seeks in the instant action. 
The state defendants would have refused to enter into a settlement agreement 
creating a contractual cause of action for damages (exempt from governmental immunity) 
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for claims that they failed to prevent third person violence or neglect against a child. 
Such liability is potentially enormous. Utah did not agree to it when it entered into the 
David C. settlement. It is not to be found in the lengthy consent decree. Such liability 
was not negotiated between the parties in David C . While the plaintiff is free to pursue 
any state or federal claims he may have, no contractual claim for damages was created by 
the David C. consent decree. The trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs Second and 
Third Causes of Action should be affirmed. 
III. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE THE NECESSARY 
NOTICE OF CLAIM CONCERNING THE 
MONITORING PANEL DEFENDANTS 
Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is a negligence claim against the Monitoring 
Panel,1 and three of its members; Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell and Larry Lunt. 
As a state law negligence action, this claim is subject to the state's Immunity Act. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State 
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
have held that the filing of the notices of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional 
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County J 999 UT 36, Tfl8, 977 P.2d 1201; Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 
1
 The Monitoring Panel has no statutory or common law basis to be sued as a legal 
entity and should therefore be dismissed as a separate defendant. If it is considered a 
separate entity that can sue and be sued, it would partake of the same governmental 
immunity as DFS, as described in the first argument of this brief. 
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P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 (Utah 
1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr; Rushton, 
1999 UT 36,1[19; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that: 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year 
after the claim arises, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1987) (in part). 
Plaintiff failed to file either of the necessary notices of claim concerning 
defendants. His notice of claim only pertains to the Division of Family Services. R. 45-
48. The monitoring panel's budget is paid by the State of Utah pursuant to the settlement 
agreement. R. 95. Defendants Atkinson, Cotterell and Lunt were paid a per diem for 
their services on the panel by the State of Utah. Id. As such, these defendants meet the 
statutory definitions of employee and governmental entity found in the Immunity Act. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-2(2) and (9) (1994). 
Because the requisite notices of claim were not filed, the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs tort claim against these defendants. The dismissal of 
plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action should therefore be affirmed. 
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IV. THE DEFENDANT MEMBERS OF THE MONITORING 
PANEL ARE ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
The role of the Monitoring Panel, in supervising the David C. consent decree, is to 
review all available information and issue a quarterly report on whether or not the 
settlement agreement has been complied with. R. 95-97. If the Panel determines that 
there has been non-compliance, it has the power to enter a corrective action plan to rectify 
the problem. R. 97. All of the decisions of the Monitoring Panel are subject to review 
and reconsideration by the supervising court. R. 97-98. Clearly, the Panel's members are 
acting as a quasi-judicial body and are entitled to absolute immunity. 
The efficient operation of the judicial process requires that those closely 
associated with it be afforded some form of immunity from civil liability. 
For that reason, the common law has long extended absolute immunity to 
judges for actions taken in their judicial capacities, except when those 
actions have been taken in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Quasi-judicial immunity has also been extended to others involved in the 
judicial process, such as prosecutors, administrative law judges, and state 
bar associations, their personnel and committees. 
Whether a person or entity should be afforded judicial immunity depends 
upon the specific work or function performed. If the acts were committed 
Min the performance of an integral part of the judicial process," the policies 
underlying judicial immunity apply and immunity should be granted. 
Bailev v. Utah State Ban 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
This Court has found that the state bar association, when acting pursuant to 
authority granted by this Court in matters of attorney discipline is entitled to quasi-judicial 
immunity. Bailev: Black v. Clegg. 938 P.2d 293, 296-97 (Utah 1997). In Ambus v. Utah 
State Bd. of Educ. 858 P.2d 1372,1378-79 (Utah 1993) this Court found that the state 
22 
school board was entitled to such immunity where it made adversarial rulings based upon 
evidence it received. 
Most analogous to the present case is Parker v. Dodgion. 971 P.2d 496,497-99 
(Utah 1998) (court-appointed psychologist entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). Just as 
the psychologist evaluated the evidence and made recommendations to the court, so does 
the monitoring panel. Its function is similar to that of a magistrate, commissioner or 
special master. Atkinson-Baker & Assoc, Inc. V. Kolts. 7 F.3d 1452, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 
1993) (special master entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity). The monitoring panel 
acted in a quasi-judicial capacity and its members are entitled to absolute immunity from 
plaintiffs claims in this action. 
For this reason as well, the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs Fourth Cause of 
Action should be affirmed, as well as the dismissal of the Second and Third Causes of 
Action as to the members of the monitoring panel.. 
V. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANTS ATKINSON, 
COTTERELL, LUNT AND THE MONITORING PANEL 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action (negligence against the 
monitoring panel and three individuals who have been members of it) on the grounds that 
he had failed to demonstrate a duty running from the monitoring panel and its members to 
the plaintiffs decedent. R. 241. In asking this Court to reverse that decision, the plaintiff 
has failed to adequately brief this issue. Instead, after a paragraph concerning whether a 
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negligence cause of action can be created by a contract, the entirety of the plaintiffs 
argument on the issue of whether these defendants owed the deceased a duty of care is 
comprised of two sentences, with a one sentence conclusion. 
The Monitoring Panel, including its duties and obligations, were established 
pursuant to the David C. Settlement Agreement. The Monitoring Panel 
Appellees duty to Breanna Loveless was to perform its contractual 
obligations skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a workmanlike manner. 
The Monitoring Panel Appellees had a duty to Breanna Loveless to perform 
its contractual obligations skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a 
workmanlike manner and the District Couifs order for summary judgment 
on behalf of the Monitoring Panel Appellees should be overturned and the 
plaintiffs negligence cause of action against the Monitoring Panel 
Appellees should be remanded to District Court for further proceedings. 
Appellant's Brief at 24. 
This Court should disregard plaintiffs argument for this reason and affirm the trial 
court's dismissal of plaintiff s Fourth Cause of Action. 
On the merits, the monitoring panel had no duty to the plaintiff or his decedent 
under the settlement agreement. Its function was to review evidence and prepare 
quarterly reports, not to become involved in individual cases. The trial court was correct 
in ruling that these defendants owed no actionable duty to the plaintiff or Breanna. 
A. Plaintiffs brief concerning his fourth cause of action should be disregarded. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the 
requirements of an appellant's brief. One requirement is that the brief set 
forth an argument. That argument "shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." As 
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we have too often had occasion to explain, "this court is not ffta depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research."111... 
Instead of providing this court with meaningful legal analysis, defendant's 
brief merely contains one or two sentences stating his argument generally, 
quotes favorable portions of the record, and then broadly concludes that he 
is entitled to relief.... 
Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 "may be disregarded or stricken, on 
motion or sua sponte by the court." 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ffi[ 6-8, 1 P.3d 1108 (citation omitted); Springville Citizens 
v.CitvofSpringville, 1999 UT 25,1f 21 n. 2, 979 P.2d 332; State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 
Tf 13, 974 P.2d 269 ("There is only superficial citation of authority and cursory legal 
analysis; his argument is hurried at best - perfunctory and slap-dash at worst. For these 
reasons, we decline to address this issue."); Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-49 
(Utah 1998); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) ("It is well 
established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has 
failed to adequately brief."). 
Plaintiff has failed to articulate what duty he claims that the monitoring panel 
defendants owed to Breanna. He has not sought to explain from what relationship and 
what responsibilities of these defendants this duty is born. Instead the plaintiff simply 
argues in a conclusory fashion that; 1) the monitoring panel defendants had certain duties 
and obligations that were created by the settlement agreement, and 2) that they had a 
responsibility to Breanna to perform these duties and obligations. No effort is made to 
articulate what the duties consisted of and in what manner they were owed to Breanna 
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personally. For this reason, defendants the monitoring panel, Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne 
Cotterell and Larry Lunt urge this Court to decline to consider plaintiffs argument 
concerning his Fourth Cause of Action and affirm the trial court's dismissal of the same. 
B. These defendants did not owe a duty of care to Breanna Loveless. 
"An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff." Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). "Traditionally, the 
common law has not required a defendant to prevent harm when doing so requires that 
the defendant control the conduct of another person or warn others about such conduct." 
Id. An exception to this general rule arises when a special relationship exists between the 
defendant and a third person which imposes a duty upon the defendant to control the 
conduct of the third person, or when a special relationship exists between the defendant 
and the person to be protected. Id; Hale v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 639 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1981). 
The monitoring panel did not have a special relationship with Breanna or Bobbie 
Dawn Widdison or Travis Widdison. Plaintiff does not seek to establish one. Rather, 
plaintiff simply claims that the federal court settlement agreement that created the 
monitoring panel imposed some form of duty upon these defendants to protect Breanna 
from harm. No such duty can be found in the settlement agreement. 
The monitoring panel is given access to information (R. 95-96) and required to 
prepare and issue quarterly reports as to whether the State of Utah is in compliance with 
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the terms of the consent decree. R. 96-97. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the panel 
has the duty to accept or prepare its own corrective action plan to bring the State of Utah 
into compliance. R. 97. The panel is supervised by, and its decisions can be appealed to, 
the federal district court. R. 97-98. Nothing in the agreement gives the panel and its 
members any duty or power whatsoever to control in any manner the way in which the 
State of Utah handles a particular individual. Instead, a system for such concerns was 
created that does not involve the panel, except that reports on how such challenges to 
individual care are resolved is to be provided to the panel for inclusion in its quarterly 
reports. R. 99-104. 
Under the undisputed provisions of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff has 
failed to show the existence of any special relationship between the monitoring panel and 
its members and Breanna Loveless such that they would have a duty to protect her. The 
trial court correctly dismissed this claim and its decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendants Michael O. Leavitt, Kerry Steadman, 
Mary T. Noonan, Jan Graham, Carol Clawson, Linda Luinstra, Pamela Atkinson, 
Sherianne Cotterell, Larry Lunt, the Monitoring Panel, the Utah Department of Human 
Services and the Division of Family Services ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of this 
action. 
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STATE DEFENDANTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants-appellees Michael O. Leavitt, Kerry Steadman, Mary T. Noonan, Jan 
Graham, Carol Clawson, Linda Luinstra, Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell, Larry 
Lunt, the Monitoring Panel, the Utah Department of Human Services and the Division of 
Family Services do not believe oral argument is necessary to the proper disposition of this 
case. However, they desire to participate if oral argument is ordered by the Court. 
DATED this Z j ^ M a y of August, 2000. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State Defendants 
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